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Case Comment

Risk Magnified:
Standing Under the Statist Lens
CentralDelta Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2002).
Why some harms count before the courts and others do not is a matter
of acute expressive and practical impact. Judicial refusal to see claimed
injuries is an effective denial of legal personhood' and a bar from powerful
judicial machinery. The issue of "erratic, even bizarre" judicial recognition
of supplicants vexed Professor Joseph Vining as early as 1978.2 Recent
scholarship argues that injuries are seen through a subjective lens, reflecting
the relative privilege of the judiciary and their concomitant difficulties in
perceiving injuries to minorities and the poor.3 This is a troubling
contention. So long as another, objective explanation remains, it should be
superimposed, not to conceal and legitimate potentially problematic
practices, but to substitute as an alternative rationality and a neutral and
transparent principal for future decisions. This Comment advances such an
alternative explanation: The erratic pattern of judicial sight is partly a
refraction of how judges view the risk of probabilistic future injury.
Present harm is immediately visible, but the contours of risked injury
are less distinct, requiring congressional or constitutional magnification.
Aspects of positive law aimed at reducing the risk of prescribed

1. See JOSEPH VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY: THE COMING OF AGE OF PUBLIC LAW 58-60 (1978)
(describing when and how courts "see" legal persons).
2. Id.at 1.
3. E.g., Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standingfor Privilege. The Failure of Injury Analysis, 82 B.U.
L. REV. 301, 304 (2002); cf Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits,
"'Injuries," and Article II1, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 188-89 (1992) ("In classifying some harms as
injuries in fact and other harms as purely ideological, courts must inevitably rely on some
standard that is normatively laden and independent of facts." (footnote omitted)).
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probabilistic future harms are telescopes. 4 Such collectively constructed
magnifiers, however, often do not track social risk or vulnerability, since
some clout is typically necessary to enshrine interests in positive law. As a
result, those whose interests are socially slighted may find themselves
similarly slighted before the courthouse doors.
This Comment proceeds in two Parts. Part I describes how the5
differential perceptions of risk as injury in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons
and Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services 6 illustrate the
rules of risk recognition employed by the judiciary. Part II discusses
Central Delta Water Agency v. United States as an example of when risks
alleged as harms do not match the risks magnified in law. 7 The Part
concludes that, in such cases, the rules of recognition established by
Supreme Court cases may be obeyed, and the crushing impact of a noinjury finding avoided by dismissal on timing grounds.
I
The standing axiom is oft-incanted. The Supreme Court interprets the
case-or-controversy requirement of Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution
to mandate three requirements for bringing suit. A plaintiff must claim (1)
an "injury in fact," (2) that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action of the defendant, and (3) that redress of the injury by a favorable
judgment is likely. 8 The Court defines an "injury in fact" as "an invasion of
a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b)
actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." 9 Future harms are thus
cognizable as injuries only if they are "imminent," the meaning of which is
"certainly impending." 0 The metric of cognizability, therefore, is the
probability of occurrence--"certainly."
The probability of a claimed future injury occurring ranges from nil to
certainty. The imminence standard shows that the Supreme Court calls for
future injuries near certainty to find standing. As discussed below, however,
the Court has viewed future injuries in the realm of probability, adopting a
statist lens. As formulated by Jerry L. Mashaw, the statist perception of
legal rights and personality depends "on legislative definitions of public
welfare and on the organizational imperatives" of the administrative state.l

4. 1 thank Professor Jerry L. Mashaw for the metaphor.

5. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
6. 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
7. 306 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2002).
8. E.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992),
9. Id. at 560 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
10. Id. at 564 n.2 (citation omitted).
11. Jerry L. Mashaw, "Rights " in the FederalAdministrative State, 92 YALE L.J. 1129, 1129

(1983).
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The judiciary may enforce goals and duties arising from these collective
definitions.' 2 In contrast, rights to adjudication under the individualist
model stem from losses. Rights are informed by the moral principle of
corrective justice.13 Standing law traditionally operates under the
individualist model.
This Comment posits that probabilistic future injuries, which are not
determinate events and therefore are invisible through the individualist lens,
can be seen through a statist lens-but only if a risk-reducing statute or
constitutional provision underlies the suit, providing the collective
judgment that the risks alleged count.' 4 When such legislative judgments
exist, the separation-of-powers concerns over judicial interference with
collectively defined policies, which underlie a rigid injury requirement, 5
are not implicated. Of course, the plaintiff still must allege personally
experienced risk, for the statist lens is hybridized with the individualist
search for personalized harm, the heart of the injury inquiry. When no
underlying risk-reducing provision provides the basis for perceiving risks,
courts do not see probabilistic injuries and try to prod allegations of risk
into allegations of an impending loss, visible under an individualist lens.
The dual nature of the injury standard becomes clearer when the injury
analysis in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons 16 is contrasted with the recent
Supreme Court decision in Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental
Services. 17 Lyons is among the most troubling examples of how
probabilistic future injuries are viewed through the individualist lens. After
a traffic stop for a burned-out taillight, Los Angeles police subjected Lyons
to a pat-down search. When Lyons dropped his hands after the search, the
officers slammed them back against his head, and when he complained of
the pain of the keys in his hand pressed against his head, the officers placed
him in a chokehold. When Lyons regained consciousness, he "was lying
face down on the ground, choking, gasping for air, and spitting up blood
and dirt. He had urinated and defecated. He was issued a traffic citation and
released." 18 The Supreme Court ruled that Lyons did not allege a sufficient
probability of future injury to seek an injunction against the use19 of
chokeholds in situations involving no threat of immediate deadly force.
12. Id. at 1154-57.
13. Id.

14. Cf JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1000 (1998)
courts "arguably
cases involving regulatory programs aimed at mitigating risk,
on whether the beneficiaries' risks have in fact been increased by failures
because, again arguably, the statute confers a right to whatever level of risk
implementation would assure").
15. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984).

(observing that in
should be focusing
of implementation
reduction effective

16. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).

17 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
18. The facts are taken from Lyons. 461 U.S. at 113, 114-15 (Marshall, J., disscnting).
19. Id. at 105-10.
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The Court ruled that Lyons's standing depended on whether he was
"likely" to suffer future injury-an amorphous adjective given bite by the
Court's requirement that the danger be "real and immediate.,, 20 The Court
read an LAPD manual to suggest that chokeholds were permitted only "to
gain control of a suspect who is violently resisting the officer or trying to
escape.,,21 The Court concluded that the probability of any future threat was
no greater than the probability that Lyons would have an encounter with the
police and illegally resist, or that officers would disobey instructions and
choke him without provocation.2"
Most revealing was the Court's statement that Lyons needed to
establish a virtual certitude of experiencing a chokehold for judicial
perception of future injury. Lyons would have to "make the incredible
assertion either (1) that all police officers in Los Angeles always choke any
citizen with whom they happen to have an encounter... or (2) that the City
ordered or authorized police officers to act in such manner., 2 3 The
requirement represents the Court's prodding of probabilistic future injury to
resemble a crystallized future event visible in the individualist universe. 24
The Court's requirement of near-certain future injury and its refusal to
recognize Lyons's concern contrasts sharply with the injury analysis in
Laidlaw. Laidlaw arose when the environmental group Friends of the Earth
brought suit under a Clean Water Act provision allowing adversely affected
citizens to enforce the limits on pollutant discharge set by a company's
permit. 25 The Court held that Friends of the Earth suffered sufficient injury
to sue for enforcement of permit limits against a hazardous waste
incinerator that had violated its mercury discharge limits 489 times between
1987 and 1995-although the district court found that the violations "did
not result in any health risk or environmental harm., 26 The Court accepted
20. Id. at 101.
21. Id. at 110 (citation omitted).
22. Id. at 106. The Court's presumption that Lyons would not resist arrest, thereby lowering
the probability of occurrence, contrasts with the Court's presumption of full enforcement of
statutes
against regulatory objects, which amplifies the probability of injury against regulatory
objects to certainty. See. e.g., Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1988). The probability
that
Lyons might be subjected to a police chokehold again was even lower than the Court's
analysis might suggest: Prompted by several deaths stemming from police chokeholds, the Board
of Police Commissioners imposed and extended a six-month moratorium on chokeholds, while the
police department investigated alternative measures. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 100 & n.4. In light of this,
Lyons withdrew his injunction request and urged that his preliminary injunction be vacated, but
the Court refused to find the suit moot, since the moratorium could be lifted. Id. at 101. Oddly, the
Court did not consider these facts in its future injury analysis.
23. Lyons, 461 U.S. at106.
24. Some of the Court's bombast in building the high wall to pleading injury may be
attributed to its view of the underlying factual issues and "a further extension and reification
of
the Court's almost instinctive respect and deference for men in uniform," as Laurence Tribe
argues. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-16, at 412-13 (3d ed.2000).
25. 528 U.S. 167, 173 (2000).
26. Id. at 176, 181 (citing findings by the district court, 956 F. Supp. 588, 602, 613-21
(D.S.C. 1997)).
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as sufficient to establish standing affidavits by the group's members that
27
they had curtailed use of the river into which the plant discharged.
Was the Court liberating standing analysis from Lyons? If Lyons had
described how his fears of future chokeholds affected his conduct, would he
have passed the injury-in-fact hurdle? Probably not, judging from the
majority's reasoning. The Laidlaw Court wrote that the reasonableness of
Lyons's fear depended on his lived nightmare recurring and his "'subjective
28
apprehensions... were not sufficient to support standing. In contrast, the
concerns of Friends of the Earth members were "reasonable" because of
29
continuous and illegal discharges in the river. Yet Lyons experienced his
fear against a backdrop of continuous deaths from chokeholds,
disproportionately suffered by people of his race and gender: Between 1975
and 1983, the date of the Lyons decision, at least sixteen people died
following the use of a chokehold by a Los Angeles police officer-twelve
of them African-American males like Lyons. 30 As Justice Marshall noted,
"[I]n a city where Negro males constitute 9% of the population, they 'have
1
of chokeholds.'
accounted for 75% of the deaths resulting from the use
This restores the question: Why were the fears of future risk
experienced by Friends of the Earth members perceptible to the Court while
Lyons's fears remained invisible? A trio of the Court's prior precedents
accepting risk of future injury as sufficient for standing may shed light.
Professor Mashaw has described the first two, United States v. Students
32
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP) and Duke Power
33
Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., as "suggest[ing] that
increased risk will satisfy the requirement of injury in fact, at least where
the statutory scheme that gives rise to the complaint is itself essentially
34
concerned with restructuring risks." A third case extends the principle to
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 181-83.
Id. at 184 (quoting Lyons, 461 U.S. at 107 n.8).
Id. at 183-84.
Lyons, 461 U.S. at 115-16 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

31. Id. at 116 n.3. The moratorium on chokeholds might have accounted for some contrast
except that neither the Lyons nor the Laidlaw Courts considered the fact in their injury analyses.
32. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
33. 438 U.S. 59(1978).
34. Mashaw, supranote 1I, at 1168. SCRAP, for example, involved a procedural claim under

the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, which requires environmental impact
statements--essentially risk assessments-for certain federal actions. 412 U.S. at 679. The Court
accepted an attenuated argument of injury: A general rate increase among railroads, approved by a
government agency without an impact statement, would (1) encourage the use of nonrecyclable
commodities, (2) thereby requiring more natural resources, which (3) might deplete those near the
plaintiffs and (4) might result in more refuse discarded where the plaintiffs enjoyed recreation. Id.
at 688. Compare SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, with Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26
(1976). The Simon Court refused to recognize as a legally cognizable injury the risk that an IRS
ruling extending tax exemptions for "charitable" groups to hospitals that did not serve indigents to
the extent of their financial ability would encourage provision of fewer medical services to
indigents. 426 U.S. at 40-43. The Court reasoned the harm was indirect since the hospitals, who
were not defendants in the suit, decided the level of service to indigents. Id. at 44-45. Yet SCRAP
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constitutional provisions concerned with mitigating risks. In Babbitt v.
United Farm Workers,35 the Court ruled that the United Farm Workers
(UFW) had standing to bring First Amendment challenges to parts of an
Arizona statute governing union practices, enforced by civil and criminal
penalties.36 The Court allowed the challenge though the UFW did not
express future intent to use the procedures. The Court noted past UFW
involvement with Arizona farmworkers, current activity in California, and
claimed "continuing burden on... associational rights" because of the
hindrance posed by the contested statute.37 The Court also found sufficient
injury for the UFW to challenge the statute's criminal sanctions, noting the
chill of the provisions on the union's engaging in regulated activities like
38
organizing and boycotting.
The trio of risk-as-injury cases highlights the significant distinction in
the Laidlaw-Lyons conundrum. The Clean Water Act underlay the claims of
Friends of the Earth, and is one of a host of statutes aimed at reducing the
risk of environmental and health harms stemming from pollution. 39 The
risks articulated by the plaintiffs-disrupted use of a nearby river stemming
from health concerns-resonated with the risks at which the statute was
aimed. Lyons, in contrast, arose after the district court granted a preliminary
injunction premised on the affront to Lyons's substantive due process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment.40 While the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment arguably mitigates the risk of a violation of other
substantive rights through procedural protections, substantive due process
defines harms. The violation of a risk-mitigating provision is heightening
the probability of harm; the violation of a harm-defining provision is an
event perpetrating the harm.

involved indirect and speculative decisions by multiple hypothetical entities to use nonrecyclable
goods prompted by a railroad rate increase rather than other factors; another layer of decisions by
local actors to sell natural resources in the plaintiffs' vicinity; and yet another layer of decisions
by users of such goods to litter. Moreover, the Simon plaintiffs alleged denials of access that had
already occurred, while SCRAP involved future hypothetical events. Both SCRAP and Simon
involved motions to dismiss, so they cannot be differentiated technically by the standards applied.
The Simon Court distinguished SCRAP as involving "specific and perceptible harm," id. at 45
n.25 (quoting SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 689), a claim not further supported by argument, nor borne out
by the facts of the case. The only intelligible difference is that an environmental statute in SCRAP
provided a collective co-institutional judgment that risks of environmental harm count. The Simon
plaintiffs pointed to no statutes saying that the interests of indigents in medical care matter.
35. 442 U.S. 289 (1979).
36. Id. at 292-93, 298-305.
37. Id, at 299-300.
38. Id. at 303. The First Amendment commands reducing the risk of chilled speech. See, e.g.,
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
39. The permit system is linked to each state's obligation to set the maximum daily load of
pollutants in co-vered waters "at a level necessary to implement the applicable water quality
standards with seasonal variations and a margin of safety." 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C) (2000).
40. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 98-100 (1983). Lyons initially alleged threats
to his First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
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II
Risk can be perceived as injury if illuminated by an underlying riskreducing statute or constitutional provision. The future probabilistic harms
alleged as injury and the risks delineated in the risk-reducing statute must
match, however. These recognition rules derive from the deference to
collective judgments underpinning statist sight of risks. What happens when
the risks do not match? Central Delta Water Agency v. United States is an
example of a court confronted with the problem.
Farmers and two state agencies representing farmers who relied on
water from the New Melones Reservoir brought suit in Central Delta
against the federal operators of the largest water-management project in the
United States, the Central Valley Project (CVP) in California.42 Congress,
after heavy lobbying by environmental groups, enacted the Central Valley
Project Improvement Act,43 which required the Bureau of Land
Reclamation, a CVP operator, to "make all reasonable efforts" to ensure by
2002 long-term sustainable natural production of anadromous fish. The Act
required the Bureau to divert water to manage 800,000 acre-feet of Project
waters to implement the goal-but required that the Bureau do so while
44
remaining in compliance with applicable state water-use permits. The
Bureau's state water-use permit to operate the New Melones Reservoir
45
required it to limit salinity concentration downstream to a set standard.
To implement the Act, the Bureau adopted an interim operations plan,
which provided for the periodic release of water from the reservoir to
supplement other water sources.46 The plaintiffs claimed the plan violated
the Bureau's obligations, citing statistical modeling by the Bureau showing
that the plan might increase water salinity enough to violate the permit's
salinity standard at least one month per year in forty-one percent of the next
seventy-one years. 47 The Bureau contended that a series of contingencies
had to occur in a dry year for the violations to occur and stated that it would
do whatever was required to stay within its permit terms, including
48
acquiring water elsewhere and adopting another plan in a dry year.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling denying standing.
The appellate court found injury in fact based on the farmers' allegations

41. 306 F.3d 938.

42. Id. at 943-44.
43. Reclamation Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575,
§§ 3401-3412, 106 Stat. 4600, 4706-31 (1992) (Title XXXIV of this Act is the Central Valley
Project Improvement Act.).
44. Central Delta Water Agency, 306 F.3d at 944-45.
45. Id. at 943.
46. Id. at 945.
47. Id. at 948.
48. Id. at 950.
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that should the salinity standard be exceeded, their crops would be damaged
by the excessively saline water.49 The court, applying Laidlaw and two
lower court cases, also based on the Clean Water Act, stated that the
necessary showing for injury was that "plaintiffs face significant risk that
the crops that they have planted will not survive as a result of the Bureau's
decision." 50 The Central Delta court tried to lay Lyons to rest in a footnote
as the "doctrine of recurring harm." 5' Regrettably, Lyons is not so easily
cabined, because the Lyons Court's injury analysis had two sides: a refusal
to extrapolate future injury from past harms and a requirement of a showing
of near certainty, rather than mere risk, of future injury. 52 The contingent
probability the Central Delta plaintiffs cited was not near certainty.
Perhaps this is why the Central Delta court tried to bolster its injury
holding by waxing lyrical about the need to permit challenges to actions
increasing the risk of environmental harms, arguing, "The extinction of a
species, the destruction of a wilderness habitat, or the fouling of air and
water are harms that are frequently difficult or impossible to remedy." 53 Yet
the farmers were not premising standing on fear over species extinction,
wilderness destruction, or fouled air and water. Rather, the Bureau diverted
water to carry out the collective goal of mitigating the risk of harm to
anadromous fish. The plaintiffs' risks were not aligned with the
environmental statutory goals underlying the suit.
The statist lens is animated by collective judgments that certain risks
count, but limited by the pronouncement of which risks count. Thus, under
the individualist lens of Lyons and the hybrid statist-individualist lens of
Laidlaw, the risks the farmers feared cannot be perceived. Time and
changing conditions, however, might make the injury appear more certain,
thus enabling its perception under the individualist lens. A dismissal on one
of the doctrines of timing-ripeness, finality, and exhaustion of
administrative remedies-would avoid the expressively and practically
crushing statement that the farmers experienced no injury, and would
preserve the statist-individualist distinction. The membrane between the
individualist and statist distinction is thin. Preserving it is important, for the
rarity of statutes solicitous of harms suffered by the vulnerable may be
more readily cured than a doctrine of selective standing, described by
Nichol, excluding those most in need of objective judicial sight because of
54
inequities and problematic subjectivities outside the courthouse.
-Mary D. Fan
49.
farmers
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 947. The court also found the state agencies had organizational standing to represent
similarly affected. Id. at 951.
Id. at 948 (emphasis added).
Id. at 949 n.7.
See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996); supra text accompanying note 23.
CentralDelta Water Agency, 306 F.3d at 950.
See Nichol, supranote 3.
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